Water Well Journal
Issue link: http://read.dmtmag.com/i/740475
tion while in the LEM during docking and undocking, lunar orbit, landing, and lunar launch—avoiding the extra weight of unnecessary seats in the one-sixth gravity of the moon. This standing posi- tion afforded an ideal view of the moon's terrain during landing that would not have been possible if the as- tronauts had been in a seated position. This had the added benefit of being able to use much smaller viewing windows for each astronaut during descent, sav- ing substantial weight on the windows alone. Engineering in action! Finally, although the descent engine in the lower half of the LEM used a fairly conventional liquid-fueled rocket design, the technology used for the as- cent engine in the upper portion of the lunar module was truly a wonder of engineering as well as simplicity. The design of this engine was as close to "fail-safe" as could be envisioned with only two moving parts required to make the engine operate. This type of reliabil- ity was needed on the ascent engine since failure of this engine would have resulted in the definite stranding and eventual death of the two astronauts on the moon. There was no direct ignition or the common lighting-the-candle sequence as with other rockets. The fuel and oxi- dizer mixture was known as a hyper- golic propellant; in other words, the two components were designed to be stored separately up to the time of launch from the moon but to ignite immediately upon contact within the engine. In fact, each engine was regarded as one-time use, built for the single pur- pose to bring two men up from the sur- face of the moon and return them to the command module. They were so unique and simple in design and operation that pre-flight testing of the engines on Earth was not even possible since that would have resulted in the probable destruction of the engine. Obviously, this faith in the engines was justly rewarded since there was a 100% reliability of the Apollo descent and ascent engines in every mission. What if they don't pay the bill? Our final unsung hero is one who some people may know, Frank Bor- man. He was an engineer and aeronau- tics professor, one of the second group of nine astronauts, a Gemini pilot, and the commander of the Apollo 8 mission in December 1968—seven months be- fore the first lunar landing of Apollo 11. His mission was the first manned flight to the moon and back and completed several orbits around the moon. Even with all these accomplishments, what I am recognizing Borman for was his involvement as one of NASA's representatives to investigate and pro- vide testimony on the fire-ravaged Apollo 1 capsule in the 1967 disaster that killed three astronauts: Virgil "Gus" Grissom, Edward White, and Roger Chaffee. Contrary to popular perception, the space program did not simply "pick up the pieces" and start over. There was a strong sentiment in Congress that space exploration was far too dangerous and not worth the risk to human life—and its funding should be curtailed. Borman's cool demeanor and rapid and honest appraisal of the circum- stances surrounding the fire during powerful testimony to a congressional subcommittee investigating the fire was instrumental in reassuring Congress and the American public the risk was worth the potential price, and that any advances in knowledge and science cannot be made without the fear of a potential loss of life. In addition, Borman's technical observations and admissions as to the exact cause of the fire were critical in making several design changes to the command module's interior—modifying the environment of the cabin from a pure oxygen environment, a highly combustible situation, to one that used a mixture of oxygen and nitrogen similar to that found in Earth's atmosphere; changing to an outward opening main Figure 4. Lunar module cutaway illustration. ENGINEERING from page 63 waterwelljournal.com 64 November 2016 WWJ