Tobacco Asia

24 tobaccoasia Issue 2, 2026 March / April He argued that many agencies "do not see the big picture," focusing on individual seizures while overlooking transnational networks. OCCRP re- porting has documented cases in which illicit flows exploited weak data sharing between countries, fragmented investigations, and failures to thorough- ly examine corporate devices or communications. OCCRP editor Alessia Cerantola said jour- nalists' cross-border networks have uncovered instances in which illicit cigarette volumes were allegedly used by companies to pressure govern- ments into lowering excise taxes—a tactic in- tended to frame tax increases as the cause of illicit trade, even in markets where independent data shows that organized crime and regulatory gaps are more significant drivers. She noted that some brands have appeared in illegal channels before being officially registered with customs, raising questions about the relation- ship between supply-chain diversion and regula- tory approval processes, though no evidence was presented. She also cited cases in which ministries of health or customs authorities delayed or sup- pressed reports on illegal trade patterns, under- scoring internal political tensions. Tuesday Reitano of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime said illicit tobacco should be prioritized in organized crime strategies rather than treated as a secondary fiscal concern. She argued that criminal groups oper- ate most effectively in areas with weak beneficial- ownership rules, in free-trade zones with limited oversight, and in under-regulated corporate regis- tration systems. She urged parties to harmonize penalties across jurisdictions, warning that criminal networks "always migrate to the path of least resistance." During the final press conference, Secretar- iat officials emphasized that the protocol already includes "sustainability mechanisms," such as li- censing fees and manufacturer-funded track-and- trace systems. However, several countries noted informally that advanced enforcement systems remain costly and technically challenging. The Secretariat replied that implementing the protocol should be viewed as "an investment," reiterating earlier comments on tax-revenue ben- efits. Independent studies, however, consistently show that tax recovery varies widely depending on governance effectiveness, border security, and the extent of illicit manufacturing. What comes next COP 11 brought very few policy changes. The biggest news from COP11 was the approval of a binding decision banning the use and sale of all tobacco and nicotine products, including nicotine pouches, on all United Nations indoor and out- door premises worldwide. Parties also adopted measures to reduce environmental damage caused by tobacco products (Article 18), including po- tential bans on cigarette filters, and to strengthen legal, civil, and criminal liability for the tobacco industry (Article 19). During COP11, parties discussed future- oriented "endgame" measures under Article 2.1, including proposals to fully ban nicotine products. Delegates described the measure as a governance and workplace health decision, though industry analysts expect it to affect procurement policies and institutional norms beyond the UN system. The developments appear to create a unified enforcement approach that emphasizes the crimi- nal justice system, limits industry-government interactions, and strengthens the role of interna- tional policing bodies in nicotine-product policy. For years, major tobacco and nicotine industry stakeholders have called for stricter enforcement against illicit tobacco products. MOP4 confirmed that the Protocol's implementation focuses on ex- panding enforcement, controlling upstream sup- ply chains, and bolstering anti-illicit-trade efforts as part of broader anti-corruption initiatives. However, questions remain. Independent analyses consistently show that illicit-market pat- terns depend on a complex interplay of tax dif- ferences, border security, retail economics, online distribution, corruption, and consumer substi- tution—not merely the presence of regulated nicotine products. Investigative reports have un- covered both industry-linked and non-industry criminal supply chains, indicating that no single actor controls illicit markets universally. Even within the EU, where tracking systems are advanced, illegal trade varies widely across countries due to cross-border price differences and enforcement capabilities. Still, the Secretariat's message to governments remained clear. "The protocol gives us the tools," Black said. "Let us use them boldly, effectively, and comprehensively." Whether governments can turn those tools into balanced, evidence-based enforcement—while recognizing the limitations of seizure data and the variety of drivers of illicit trade—remains the key question as the Protocol advances to its next stage. With COP11 entering the planning stages for 2027's COP12 and MOP4's decisions set in motion, the nicotine and tobacco industries hope that the remainder of 2026 brings a more aggres- sive, enforcement-focused global regulatory envi- ronment than at any time since FCTC entered into force. They're hopeful but not convinced. The 12th Conference of Parties (COP12) and the 5th session of the Meeting of Parties (MOP5) are scheduled to be held in 2027 in Yere- van, Armenia. COP 11 brought very few policy changes.

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