Issue link: https://read.dmtmag.com/i/91181
Insurgency Tracking geographic factors such as size and the difficulty to access areas that lack basic infrastructure such as roads and communications. Africa covers more than 30.3 million square kilo- meters. Combined, the lower 48 United States, India, Argentina, Western Europe, the British Isles and China make up just 29.8 million square kilometers, so these entire landmasses could fit into the continent's boundary with 500,000 square kilometers to spare. The area that LRA operates in comprises one of Figure 2. A map shows the current range of the ethnic language group of the Azande, the primary group in the tri-border region and main targets of the LRA (llmap.org/languages/zne/static_map.html). the poorest and most-isolated areas of the world, contributing to the organization's longevity. Roads and communication in LRA's area of operation are severely degraded, hindering international and regional trade. Although al-Qaida affiliates, such as AQIM, rely on places in Central Africa are vulnerable and, as a result, often victimized. Is it possible to use available data in a manner simi- lar to local law enforcement to predict what may be the next course of action (COA)? The answer is yes. In September 2011, an attempt was made to docu- ment and analyze, using spatial statistics, the activities of LRA from 2009-2011. This analysis is derived from geospatial, unclassified open-source intelligence that includes open-source press statements, academic journals and articles as well as international and non- government organization (NGO) databases, and a suc- cessful prediction was actually made. Many people in the world now are aware of the LRA thanks to the "Kony 2012" video that went viral in March 2012, but there were always a few that knew and struggled to make the world realize what was happening. Africa's Size Central When analyzing African issues, aspects of geography must be considered or they will be doomed to fail regarding any issue—humanitarian or otherwise. Any understanding of the problem's scope must begin with 16 GEO W ORLD / OCTOBER 2O12 major trade routes and smuggling networks for facili- tation, daily sustainment and operational movement, these major trade routes aren't a supporting factor for LRA. Inaccessibility in this area leaves villages cut off from security and humanitarian services, creating the circumstances that allow LRA to take advantage of them for recruits and logistical support. In mid-March and early May 2011, elements of LRA transitioned to CAR, and their attacks left at least scores dead, 10,000 displaced and 411 people flee- ing to the DRC. The LRA is a major factor of regional instability in the area between northeastern DRC, northern Uganda, south Sudan and CAR. In December 2008, the Ugandan Army launched "Operation Lightning Thunder" aimed at hunting down Joseph Kony and destroying LRA's military capabilities, but it resulted in LRA becoming more regionalized, with continuous foraging movements of smaller cells among each of the three countries in the tri-border region. Today, most LRA ground forces are comprised of child soldiers, with some estimating the number around 80 percent of the total forces. Uganda's description of the Lightening Thunder operation in 2008 as a success ignores the secondary effects it had on destabilizing the entire region. The Ugandan government characterizes LRA as a "cause- less and homeless group" and states that it killed or captured more than 350 LRA fighters and that there are only about 200 remaining. But because of LRA's fluid nature, it's difficult to determine who is a fighter and who is not (child soldiers or slaves?). LRA is constantly kidnapping villagers, killing many and training others to become fighters, while keeping others—women and girls, in particular—as laborers and sex slaves.