Issue link: https://read.dmtmag.com/i/490948
I DA U N I V E R S A L M a rc h -A p r i l 2 0 1 5 52 LEGAL LINE Continued from page 11 should not be applied for, and is fully at risk in the future for being declared invalid, if the application is not made within 12 months of the fi rst public disclosure of the key elements of the invention that defi nes the patent. is seems straightfor- ward, and o en is. Simply put, keeping the research and development activities within a controlled group of people until enough work had been done to make the commercial decision to seek a patent should not be that hard, but it can be. Here are some examples from cases past that have resulted in long and costly litigation that both protected and, conversely, invalidated patents already granted. e fi rst example was a track chain master link. In this hard-fought case, a company that admittedly infringed on the patent tried to convince the court that the patent was invalid, because the track chain was developed in a joint research project with a smaller OEM. ey asserted this constituted a "public disclosure" more than one year before the patent application was fi led. erefore, the patent was invalid and could not be infringed upon. What saved the patent holder was the fact that the OEM project was started and conducted under an agree- ment regarding the disclosures of the invention by the track chain company and the OEM. By entering into a carefully cra ed written agreement that expressly identifi ed the project (and the endurance testing of the track chain solely at the OEM's proving grounds) as confi dential trade secret undertakings, the court found that the infringer's argument completely failed. e infringing company was kicked out of the U.S. market as one of the court's penalties. A second example came from an OEM's playbook: An OEM started a project with a new, and soon-to-be a key, worldwide vendor, but as policy, the OEM would not enter into a written agree- ment identifying the confi - dential nature of the project and establishing rules and boundaries for what might be deemed public disclosure in the future. e vendor was lulled into a sense of security by the OEM, the good working relationship as the project moved forward, and the lure of a big payoff of orders if the vendor's technology panned out. What actually happened was that when the time came to discuss orders and possible licensing, the inevitable divorce occurred. In this genuinely tragic situation, not only did the OEM claim that the entire project was a public disclosure (referencing the OEM's use of the products in development on highway trucks and equipment on fi eld test at customers of the OEM), but the OEM added insult to injury by claiming that the OEM's engineers were co-inventors and were unlawfully omitted on the patent applications fi led by the vendor during the project. Finally, in completely separate secret patent applications, the OEM claimed that key parts of the technology were invented by the OEM engineers, not the vendor's. Not surprisingly, several years of bitter litigation ended in a draw. Another painful situation occurred when a manufac- turing and engineering- oriented company hired a respected industrial design consulting fi rm to help them make some new products more physically attractive to a previously undersold market. e consulting company had its standard engagement agree- ment and some clever lawyers, who buried an innocent looking clause in the fi ne print that made the consulting company, and its employees, co-inventors of anything that came out of the project. us, the manufacturing company ended up with not only a he y consulting bill, but also an obligation to pay a royalty on each of the several patents that came out of the project. ese examples are merely snowfl akes on the tip of the iceberg. Every day, new cases are decided a er years of nasty and expensive litigation seeking to determine when a patented invention fi rst saw the light of day and to defi ne who was the true legal inventor. is is high stakes gambling at the Federal Court Casino, and losers go home broke. However, such examples also illustrate how the protec- tion, which is available even to modest sized companies, is not that diffi cult to put into place, and more importantly, that understanding and capital- izing on the legal deadlines is equally straightforward. Here's how it works: First, without question, always ensure that every employee in the company on the date of hire (or a er, if this will be a new policy) signs an appropriate agreement of non-disclosure, confi dentiality, non-compete, and assignment of "inventor's rights" to the company, so that there will be no questions in the future regarding who owns any invention or what is confi den- tial. Second, in every situa- tion where one or more of your vendors is involved in the development of a new product, a simple, carefully designed agreement is needed to defi ne confi dentiality and non-disclosure and to make the vendors acknowledge and agree that every contribution to the project is "work for hire" and that the results and any present or future patent rights belong solely to you. ird, make sure that there are no holes when executing "Second" above. Drill down with the vendors and confi dentially make them provide you their internal agreements with employees and principals that clearly identify their confi denti- ality, "non-competition," and assignment of any invention rights to the vendor, who then will transfer those rights to you as part of your agreement. A very bad outcome is for a vendor's employee to quit and go to work for a competitor of yours or your vendor and take the technology and patent rights, as well. Fourth, make sure the vendor agreements guarantee exclusivity not only for the products and inventions being developed, but also for any off spring products and inventions of the project in

