Issue link: https://read.dmtmag.com/i/91181
An HF radio network would be used as an early warning mechanism. Analysis of such data would allow partners to provide equipment to fill in gap areas with no coverage, and security-force monitoring would allow for a quick response if an appeal for help went out. Coordinating efforts, using all available resources, could drastically diminish LRA's ability to function. There's a significant lack of diverse and continuous data available for this area. What are available, espe- cially from NGOs, tend to be fragmented, compartmen- talized, difficult to acquire, and in multiple formats with varying degrees of accuracy and timeliness. Problems and Shortfalls Aiding LRA In May 2010, the UN issued Security Council resolu- tion 1925, which ordered United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO) support of "ongoing military operations to comple- tion" and included provisions for protecting Congolese civilians. Resolution 1812 from 2008 orders United Nations Missions in Sudan (UNMIS) to effectively do the same in Sudan. Both resolutions were issued inde- pendently and without coordination. There's a persistent lack of data across the entire area of interest, including, but not limited to, popu- lated places, infrastructure, communications tow- ers, detailed terrain features, available healthcare, illness, weather trends, schools, criminal activity and economic statistics. There's a lack of inter- and intra-agency cooperation—hubs of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) don't necessarily have data from each local office within their respective areas, and what data exist at local levels aren't kept in a centralized location. Another example is the dual UN missions of MONUSCO in the DRC and UNMIS in Sudan—although they're under the same umbrella organization, there's neither a combined chain of command nor a mandate to share data and resources outside their respective mission areas. The following are major difficulties: Figure 4). More detailed data exist at village, district or provincial levels, but only when people know exactly what they're looking for (i.e., the name of the IDP camp or NGO holding the data). - cult due to rapid LRA movement. The statistics frequently change dramatically from one month to the next. Figure 5. A map describes a Catholic-run HF radio network being implemented in northeast DRC (salsa.democracyinaction. org/o/2241/images/FINAL_From%20Promise%20to%20Peace_ Resolve%20Publication.pdf). Figure 6. The thickness of the typical vegetation canopy in northeast DRC provides cover and concealment for movement on the ground without any risk of being detected overhead (c2052482. r82.cf0.rackcdn.com/images/383/original/Protection_Plan.pdf). Remote sensing (e.g., foliage-penetrating radar combined with LIDAR) could be used to detect ground movement of personnel, but getting security forces to the area and through the canopy would still prove problematic. OCTOB E R 2O12 / WWW . GEOPLA CE . COM 19