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Insurgency Tracking the protected and heavily forested areas. The populated places in Figure 3 come from the CIESEN database of Columbia University. Although this analysis is interesting, is it of useful? Given the area's sheer size and lack of infrastructure and resources to combat LRA, combined with three countries whose attitudes toward each other can be contentious, the answer seems to be no, but there's a pattern of movement that may be of some use. The analysis should support a group engaged in hunting LRA, or it satisfies little. When examining the various incidents through time, activity seems to focus in the northeast DRC in 2009 and move westward along the CAR/DRC border in 2010. Data published by the United Nations (UN) for the first half of 2011 indi- cated attacks moved back eastward in the northeast DRC region and have since moved into CAR. Assessments and Recommendations The LRA is a unique threat that occupies a large area spanning three borders in Central Africa. The LRA can take advantage of political and geographic terrain that hinders regional and international cooperation. Furthermore, LRA remains a significant challenge to humanitarian aid due its high mobility and capability to carry out sudden attacks in an unsecure region. The dramatic increase in IDPs throughout Orientale Province (DRC) is directly attributed to the persis- tent state of insecurity caused by LRA's presence. Humanitarian access to affected populations remains difficult due to poor security conditions and minimal paved-road infrastructure. Based on vegetation-pattern data from the World Resource Institute, the most highly correlated factor associated with LRA presence in an area is dense forest. However, other factors that appear to primarily attract LRA activity are related to population—it needs a supply of "labor." These populated places provide logistical support in the form of food, supplies and labor from the traditional farmers. Repellant factors are lacking in this assess- ment, because LRA is a reactionary group that moves quickly in response to changing environments, such as transient populations and military operations. One recommendation would be for improved intel- ligence sharing among all regional partners to provide consistent information and improve cross-border coor- dination, which would further aid security and humani- tarian assistance. However, many regional partners have issues with each other (e.g., Uganda's 1990s invasion of DRC, and disputes between Uganda and Sudan over water rights on the Nile River) and may not be able to cooperate to the degree necessary. Another recommendation would be better mapping of IDP camps and the movement of populations among them, which could result in improved analysis that sup- ports and better directs future security and humanitarian efforts in the region. The construction of a major road in the region would significantly open up remote areas and give easier access to security and humanitarian aid in susceptible areas. What hinders response time by humanitarian NGOs and security-response forces from the three nations also is a supporting factor for LRA. Improved telecommunications in the region could Figure 4. A KDE analysis of the tri-border region shows that the bulk of 2009-2010 LRA attacks were co-located near roads and protected conservation areas that provide ample areas for cover and concealment after an attack has taken place. 18 GEO W ORLD / OCTOBER 2O12 shorten security and aid-response time. A high-frequency (HF) network is being incrementally established by Catholic missionaries in DRC as funding is available (see Figure 4). This was identified as a strategy by Catholic missionaries in their "Invisible Children Protection Plan."