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Issue link: https://read.dmtmag.com/i/126085
dateline CSB on Richmond refinery fire: Chevron failed to apply safer design Missed opportunities to apply inherently safer design, failure to identify and evaluate damage mechanism hazards, and the lack of effective safeguards culminated in the vapor cloud release and massive fire that occurred at the Chevron refinery on August 6, 2012, a draft report by the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) has found. The investigation team concluded that enhanced regulatory oversight with greater worker involvement and public participation are needed to improve oil refinery safety, the board said in a statement issued on April 15. Here is more from the statement: The report, subject to a board vote at a CSB public meeting in Richmond, notes that Chevron repeatedly over a ten-year period failed to effectively apply inherently safer design principles and upgrade piping in its crude oil processing unit that was extremely corroded and ultimately ruptured on August 6, 2012. The ensuing release of hydrocarbons endangered 19 workers who narrowly escaped from a vapor cloud before it ignited, causing a fire that sent a plume across the area. 15,000 people sought medical treatment in the weeks following the accident. The CSB investigation team proposed to the board urgent recommendations, including that at all its refineries, Chevron perform damage mechanism hazard reviews and ensure safeguards are in place to control identified hazards. Reporting of process safety indicators to enable more effective oversight by federal, state, and local regulatory agencies is also urgently recommended. The refinery is located in the city of Richmond; a Contra Costa County community located about ten miles northeast of San Francisco. A series of recommendations are proposed to the mayor and city council of Richmond, and the Contra Costa County supervisors, aimed at strengthening the local Industrial Safety Ordinance and driving the risk of major accidents as low as reasonably practicable. Featured News Chevron refinery fire report Work Truck certification challenge EPA's March biodiesel figures Boston bombing hits home New leadership at CEMA Colonial Chemical's new bulk DEF locations Oilmen's DEF insulated tanker Intellidyne expands sales coverage OESP's trade show The report recommends the governor and legislature of the State of California create amulti-agency program for all California oil refineries to improve the public accountability, transparency and performance of process safety programs. And the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency was urged to assist the state to monitor the effective implementation of programs designed to improve oil refinery safety and disclosure requirements the CSB is recommending to the state and local agencies. The CSB investigation team determined that although Chevron policy calls for the use of inherently safer technology in design and upgrades, the company has been implementing changes – such as the critical metallurgy of piping – without any documented, thorough analysis of the proposed inherently safer solutions. The investigators wrote, "Without such a review, the material selected cannot be analyzed to determine if it is the best inherently safer solution for the process in order to minimize risk." The report continues, "Chevron has repeatedly failed to implement the proposed inherently safer recommendations." Had this been done, the investigation team concluded, the accident could have been prevented. The CSB investigation team determined that had Chevron followed its own internal recommendations, or been required by local, state or federal regulation to implement inherently safer systems during repairs, it would have years ago upgraded critical crude unit sidecut piping from carbon steel to metallurgy more resistant to sulfidation corrosion – metal deterioration caused by the presence of sulfur compounds at high temperatures in the crude unit. Such a material upgrade could have prevented the accident. Even when rebuilding the crude oil unit after the August 2012 release and fire, the CSB report notes, Chevron did not install what the CSB considers inherently safer stainless steel piping in the destroyed distillation tower, choosing instead, with no documented inherently safer technology review, an alloy called 9-Chrome that is more corrosion-resistant than carbon steel but less resistant than stainless steel. The report notes this was despite the fact that the company did install stainless steel piping in the 4-sidecut section of the distillation tower in a nearly identical refinery unit in El Segundo, California in 2001, considering it to be the safest material. Industrial safety ordinances in both Richmond and Contra Costa County jurisdictions, the report found, have language addressing the desirability of using inherently safer processes, material, and other technology, but do not require it. Furthermore, the report states, the existing regulations do not require documentation supporting the adequacy of existing "inherently safer" claims, so Chevron did not have to document its evaluation and decision to not upgrade the 4-s idecut pipe section that ultimately failed. At a higher regulatory level, the report notes that neither the California Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/ OSHA), nor federal OSHA, which delegates employee safety regulation to the state, requires inherently safer processes to be utilized in any standard or regulation. Nor does either agency require damage www.fueloilnews.com | FUEL OIL NEWS | MAY 2013 3